Wilkinson v. Dotson

Today the Supreme Court issued an 8-1 opinion in Wilkinson v. Dotson, No. 03-287 (U.S. Mar. 7, 2005).  Justice Breyer authored the opinion and set up the case:

Two state prisoners brought an action under 42 U. S. C. §1983 claiming that Ohio’s state parole procedures violate the Federal Constitution. The prisoners seek declaratory and injunctive relief. The question before us is whether they may bring such an action under Rev. Stat. §1979, 42 U. S. C. §1983, the Civil Rights Act of 1871, or whether they must instead seek relief exclusively under the federal habeas corpus statutes. We conclude that these actions may be brought under §1983.

Some background.
Under Heck v. Humphrey, a state prisoner may not bring a §1983 action challenging "the fact or duration" of his confinement.  A state prisoner can't sue the police for violating his Fourth Amendment rights, e.g., his right to be free from unreasonable searches, if that goes to the "fact" of his confinement.  It goes towards the fact of his confinement if the improperly seized evidence was used to convict him.  The Heck v. Humphrey  rule requires the prisoner to litigate his issue in a habeas proceeding.

The Heck v. Humphrey  bar is absolute.  As Justice Breyer notes in Wilkinson:

[A] state prisoner’s §1983 action is barred (absent prior invalidation)—no matter the relief sought (damages or equitable relief), no matter the target of the prisoner’s suit (state conduct leading to conviction or internal prison proceedings)—if success in that action would necessarily demonstrate the invalidity of confinement or its duration.

Slip op. at 7.  Although the "fact" aspect of Heck is easy to understand, the "duration" prong is somewhat difficult to wrap one's mind around.  For example, what if a prisoner sues prison administrators for depriving him, without due process, of the property interest in his good-time credits?

The lawsuit doesn't go to duration the way directly attacking the state sentencing court's judgment does.  Indeed, the prisoner would argue that he's suing to vindicate a property right.  Alas, his claim touches duration, since a court would, by restoring good time credits, be shortening the prisoner's sentence.  See Preiser v. Rodriguez.  Preiser gave a rule tough for some to accept, but it was easy enough to understand.

Then in Wolff v. McDonnell, the Court decided to confuse me.  Here is Justice Breyer, in Wilkinson, describing the holding of Wolff:

[In Wolff the Court held that] the inmates could use §1983 to obtain a declaration (as a predicate to their requested damages award) that the disciplinary procedures were invalid. They could also seek by way of ancillary relief, an otherwise proper injunction enjoining the prospective enforcement of invalid prison regulations.  In neither case would victory for the prisoners necessarily have meant immediate release or a shorter period of incarceration; the prisoners attacked only the wrong procedures, not . . . the wrong result (i.e., the denial of good-time credits).

Slip op. at 5 (citations and quotation marks omitted).  Not content to merely confuse me, the Court in Edwards v. Balisok  later held, according to Justice Breyer:

[H]abeas was the sole vehicle for the inmate's constitutional challenge insofar as the prisoner sought declaratory relief and money damages, because the principal procedural defect complained of, namely deceit and bias on the part of the decisionmaker, would, if established, necessarily imply the invalidity of the deprivationof Balisok's good-time credits.  Hence, success on the prisoner’s claim for money damages (and the accompanying claim for declaratory relief) would necessarily imply the invalidity of the punishment imposed. Nonetheless, the prisoner’s claim for an injunction barring future unconstitutional procedures did not fall within habeas’ exclusive domain. That is because ordinarily, a prayer for such prospective relief will not necessarily imply the invalidity of a previous loss of good-time credits.

Id. at 5-6.  Now comes the facts of Wilkinson.

In Wilkinson two state prisoners are challenging parole procedures under the Due Process and Ex Post Facto clauses.  The parole procedures, if changed by the Court, would affect the time the prisoners would spend in prison.  Seems like it would fall under the "duration" element of Heck, no?

Well, no.  Justice Breyer wrote:

Applying [Heck, Wolff, Preiser, Balisok] to the present case, we conclude that respondents' claims are cognizable under §1983, i.e., they do not fall within the implicit habeas exception. Dotson and Johnson seek relief that will render invalid the state procedures used to deny parole eligibility (Dotson) and parole suitability (Johnson).  Neither respondent seeks an injunction ordering his immediate or speedier release into the community. And as in Wolff, a favorable judgment will not necessarily imply the invalidity of their convictions or sentence.  Success for Dotson does not mean immediate release from confinement or a shorter stay in prison; it means at most new eligibility review, which at most will speed consideration of a new parole application.  Success for Johnson means at most a new parole hearing at which Ohio parole authorities may, in their discretion, decline to shorten his prison term.

Wilkinson at *7.  In other words, the remedial tail will wag the Heck dog.

UPDATE: What will Wilkinson mean?  Professor Berman wants to know: Will "Dotson ...  bring a new wave of §1983 litigation."  I'd love to hear Norm's answer.  Here's mine -- In a word, yes.

Before Wilkinson v. Dotson, parole procedures were almost unreviewable.  The parole board usually stamped a big bold "DENIED" on the application.  There wasn't much recourse for the prisoner, other than to wait patiently for another hearing.  Most people thought there was little to do.  Indeed, the ACLU's Prisoners' Rights fact sheet does not even contain a section on parole procedures.

My reading of Wilkinson  is that the full panoply of constitutional challenges are available to the prisoner.  So long as the prisoner styles his action as one for limited declaratory and injunctive relief, the section 1983 action will lie.  What do I mean by limited?

The prisoner can not ask that the parole board's findings be overturned.  But he can now get a declaratory judgment from a judge stating that the parole procedures were invalid.  And thus, the prisoner would be entitled to a new hearing.  However, the judge can not rule: "Therefore, the prisoner should be granted parole [his sentence must be reduced]."  The issue is one of procedure. 

The prisoner may also seek injunctive relief, assuming he meets the requirement of City of Los Angeles v. Lyons (holding that 1983 plaintiff must face imminent injury from unconstitutional practice to meet Article III case or controversy requirement), the prisoner could invalidate a parole board's procedures before facing the parole board. Of course, please don't forget about the PLRA!

And we can not read Wilkinson  in a vacuum.  The contours of the constitutional rights, if any, available before parole boards are yet to be drawn.  But post-Wilkinson, lawyers as artists can start painting them.

A law student looking for a pro bono project should volunteer to help prisoner's file 1983 actions to ensure that parole procedures are constitutional.  It will be rewarding and educational.

Today the Supreme Court issued an 8-1 (WHR participated) opinion in Wilkinson v. Dotson, No. 03-287 (Mar. 7, 2005).  Justice Breyer authored the opinion and set up the case:

Two state prisoners brought an action under 42 U. S. C. §1983 claiming that Ohio’s state parole procedures violate the Federal Constitution. The prisoners seek declaratory and injunctive relief. The question before us is whether they may bring such an action under Rev. Stat. §1979, 42 U. S. C. §1983, the Civil Rights Act of 1871, or whether they must instead seek relief exclusively under the federal habeas corpus statutes. We conclude that these actions may be brought under §1983.

Some background.
Under Heck v. Humphrey, a state prisoner may not bring a §1983 action challenging "the fact or duration" of his confinement.  A state prisoner can't sue the police for violating his Fourth Amendment rights, e.g., his right to be free from unreasonable searches, if that goes to the "fact" of his confinement.  It goes towards the fact of his confinement if the improperly seized evidence was used to convict him.  The Heck v. Humphrey rule requires the prisoner to litigate his issue in a habeas proceeding.

The Heck v. Humphrey bar is absolute.  As Justice Breyer notes in Wilkinson:

[A] state prisoner’s §1983 action is barred (absent prior invalidation)—no matter the relief sought (damages or equitable relief), no matter the target of the prisoner’s suit (state conduct leading to conviction or internal prison proceedings)—if success in that action would necessarily demonstrate the invalidity of confinement or its duration.

Id. at *7.  Although the "fact" aspect of Heck is easy to understand, the "duration" prong is somewhat difficult to wrap one's mind around.  For example, what if a prisoner sues prison administrors for depriving him, without due process, of the property interest in his good-time credits?

The lawsuit doesn't go to duration the way directly attacking the state sentencing court's judgment does.  Indeed, the prisoner would argue that he's suing to vindicate a property right.  Alas, his claim touches duration, since a court would, by restoring good time credits, be shortening the prisoner's sentence.  See Preiser v. Rodriguez.  Preiser gave a rule tough for some to accept, but it was easy enough to understand.

Then in Wolff v. McDonnell, the Court decided to confuse me.  Here is Justice Breyer, in Wilkinson, describing the holding of Wolff:

[In Wolff the Court held that] the inmates could use §1983 to obtain a declaration (as a predicate to their requested damages award) that the disciplinary procedures were invalid. They could also seek by way of ancillary relief, an otherwise proper injunction enjoining the prospective enforcement of invalid prison regulations.  In neither case would victory for the prisoners necessarily have meant immediate release or a shorter period of incarceration; the prisoners attacked only the wrong procedures, not . . . the wrong result (i.e., the denial of good-time credits).

Wilkinson at *5 (citations and quotation marks omitted).  Not content to merely confuse me, the Court in Edwards v. Balisok later held, according to Justice Breyer:

[H]abeas was the sole vehicle for the inmate's constitutional challenge insofar as the prisoner sought declaratory relief and money damages, because the principal procedural defect complained of, namely deceit and bias on the part of the decisionmaker, would, if established, necessarily imply the invalidity of the deprivationof Balisok's good-time credits.  Hence, success on the prisoner’s claim for money damages (and the accompanying claim for declaratory relief) would necessarily imply the invalidity of the punishment imposed. Nonetheless, the prisoner’s claim for an injunction barring future unconstitutional procedures did not fall within habeas’ exclusive domain. That is because ordinarily, a prayer for such prospective relief will not necessarily imply the invalidity of a previous loss of good-time credits.

Wilkinson at *5-6.  Now comes the facts of Wilkinson.

In Wilkinson two state prisoners are challenging parole procedures under the Due Process and Ex Post Facto clauses.  The parole procedures, if changed by the Court, would affect the time the prisoners would spend in prison.  Seems like it would fall under the "duration" element of Heck, no?

Well, no.  Justice Breyer wrote:

Applying [Heck, Wolff, Preiser, Balisok] to the present case, we conclude that respondents' claims are cognizable under §1983, i.e., they do not fall within the implicit habeas exception. Dotson and Johnson seek relief that will render invalid the state procedures used to deny parole eligibility (Dotson) and parole suitability (Johnson).  Neither respondent seeks an injunction ordering his immediate or speedier release into thecommunity. And as in Wolff, a favorable judgment will not necessarily imply the invalidity of their convictions or sentence.  Success for Dotson does not mean immediate release from confinement or a shorter stay in prison; it means at most new eligibility review, which at most will speed consideration of a new parole application.  Success for Johnson means at most a new parole hearing at which Ohio parole authorities may, in their discretion, decline to shorten his prison term.

Wilkinson at *7.  In other words, the remedial tail will wag the Heck dog.

UPDATE: What will Wilkinson mean?  Professor Berman wants to know: Will "Dotson ...  bring a new wave of §1983 litigation."  I'd love to hear Norm's answer.  Here's mine -- In a word, yes.

Before Wilkinson v. Dotson, parole procedures were almost unreviewable.  The parole board usually stamped a big bold "DENIED" on the application.  There wasn't much recourse for the prisoner, other than to wait patiently for another hearing.  Most people thought there was little to do.  Indeed, the ACLU's Prisoners' Rights fact sheet does not even contain a section on parole procedures.

My reading of Wilkinson is that the full panolply of constitutional challenges are available to the prisoner.  So long as the prisoner styles his action as one for limited declaratory and injunctive relief, the section 1983 action will lie.  What do I mean by limited?

The prisoner can not ask that the parole board's findings be overturned.  But he can now get a declaratory judgment from a judge stating that the parole procedures were invalid.  And thus, the prisoner would be entitled to a new hearing.  However, the judge can not rule: "Therefore, the prisoner should be granted parole [his sentence must be reduced]."  The issue is one of procedure. 

The prisoner may also seek injunctive relief, assuming he meets the requirement of City of Los Angeles v. Lyons (holding that 1983 plaintiff must face imminent injury from unconstitutional practice to meet Article III case or controversy requirement), the prisoner could invalidate a parole board's procedures before facing the parole board. Of course, please don't forget about the PLRA!

And we can not read Wilkinson in a vacuum.  The countours of the constitutional rights, if any, available before parole boards are yet to be drawn.  But post-Wilkinson, lawyers as artists can start painting them.

A law student looking for a pro bono project should volunteer to help prisoner's file 1983 actions to ensure that parole procedures are constitutional.  It will be rewarding and educational.